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Abstract: We measure the success of fiscal consolidation, with alternative definitions, 
based on ad-hoc quantitative approaches and on a policy-action approach. The 
cyclically adjusted primary balance, and the duration of the consolidation contribute for 
its success, and the opposite applies for revenue based consolidations. 
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1. Introduction 
The economic and financial crisis of 2008-09, the fiscal stimuli that followed and the 
subsequent need for fiscal consolidation brought about again the question of whether 
such retrenchment should be conducted via reducing public expenditures or an increase 
in revenues, and also whether the duration of such fiscal adjustment matters.  
In the literature’s attention has been given to the conditions for successful fiscal 
consolidations, which can bring about a significant reduction in the debt ratio. For 
instance, the composition of the adjustment (Giudice et al., 2004, Afonso et al., 2006), 
its size and persistence, the gravity of the fiscal imbalance, the international 
environment and preceding devaluations (Heylen and Everaert, 2000). Still, how to 
determine a successful fiscal adjustment remains a non-consensual matter. 
For instance, Alesina and Perotti (1995), Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), McDermott 
and Wescott (1996), Alesina and Ardagna (1998) and Perotti (1998) hint at a higher 
likelihood of success when the adjustment is more spending based, which is contested 
by Heylen and Everaert (2000), while Barrios et al. (2010) report that countries facing 
higher initial levels of government debt have a better probability of pursuing successful 
fiscal consolidations.  
Therefore, we assess in an OCED panel, with a logit specification, the determinants 
of successful fiscal consolidations, with alternative labelling of fiscal episodes. Our 
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contribution lies, most notably, on the cross-checking of several alternative methods so 
as to confer robustness to the overall analysis. Hence, on the one hand, we make use of 
existing approaches to determine fiscal episodes, based on the cyclically adjusted 
primary balance. On the other hand, we rely also on the policy action-based approach 
proposed by the IMF (Devries et al., 2011) to identify fiscal episodes. Our results show 
that changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance, and the duration of the fiscal 
consolidation episode contribute for the success of the consolidation, and the opposite 
applies if the latter is more based on the revenue side.  
 
2. Fiscal episodes 
2.1. Approaches to determine fiscal episodes 
The most commonly used approaches to determine fiscal episodes (either fiscal 
adjustments or expansions) are based on the changes in the cyclically adjusted primary 
budget balance, which allows the correction of the effects resulting from economic 
activity such as inflation or real interest rate changes. Therefore, we use the change in 
the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance as a percentage of GDP, a widely used 
measure, along the lines of Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), Alesina and Ardagna (1998), 
and Afonso (2010), and we determine the periods where fiscal episodes occur, which 
we label in our study respectively FE1, FE2, and FE3.  
The FE1 measure follows Alesina and Ardagna (1998) who consider the change in 
the primary cyclically adjusted budget balance that is at least 2 percentage points of 
GDP in one year or at least 1.5 percentage points on average in the last two years.  
On the other hand, the FE2 measure is the definition used by Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1996) who proposed using the cumulative changes in the primary cyclically adjusted 
budget balance that are at least 5, 4, 3 percentage points of GDP in respectively 4, 3 or 2 
years, or 3 percentage points in one year.  
The FE3 measure, used by Afonso (2010), defines the occurrence of a fiscal episode 
when either the change in the primary cyclically adjusted balance is at least one and a 
half times the standard deviation (in the panel) in one year, or when such change is at 
least one standard deviation on average in the last two years. 
 Finally, we also use the fiscal consolidations episodes identified by the IMF1. These 
episodes are identified by looking at IMF and OECD historical reports and by checking 
what countries intended to do at the time of publication. The IMF’s policy-action based 
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approach uses descriptive historical facts to describe what happened to the deficit in a 
particular period. 
Our analysis covers the period 1970-2010 for 14 European Union countries plus 
other four OECD economies: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, U.K., and Australia, 
Canada, Japan and the U.S. Overall, we have a annual panel whose dimension reaches a 
maximum of 738 observations.2 
 
2.2. The fiscal episodes 
In Table 1 we report the fiscal episodes computed according to the above mentioned 
four strategies. Under the headings FE1, FE2, and FE3 we report the fiscal episodes, 
computed using the three alternative approaches proposed respectively by Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1996), Alesina and Ardagna (1998), and Afonso (2010), as discussed in the 
previous section. In addition, we also report in the table the fiscal contraction episodes 
as taken from Devries et al. (2011). 
[Table 1] 
From Table 1 we observe that the number of fiscal contractions ranges from 59, in 
the approach proposed by Afonso (2010), to 79, using the approach from Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1996) approach. The IMF reports a much higher number of years where fiscal 
contractions take place (in around 42% of the years there are fiscal contractions), even 
though the covered time sample is smaller (1980-2007).  
The average duration of the reported fiscal episodes is around 1.6 years for the 
approaches of Alesina and Ardagna (1998), and Afonso (2010), around 2 years 
following the approach proposed by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), and around 3.8 years 
for the fiscal contractions identified by the so-called policy action-based approach. 
The three methods that determine fiscal episodes on the basis of the change in the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance essentially coincide in identifying, for instance, the 
fiscal contractions of Denmark in 1983-84 and of Ireland in 1988-89. A broadly similar 
pattern also emerges from the IMF approach.  
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2.3. Characteristics of the fiscal episodes 
Regarding the characteristics of the fiscal episodes, the fiscal conditions prevailing 
just before the beginning of a consolidation episode seem to have had an impact on the 
size of subsequent efforts.3 The larger the cyclically adjusted primary deficit, the larger 
was the size of ensuing fiscal consolidation. This may reflect that large deficits made it 
more necessary to consolidate and, at the same time, raised public awareness of the 
extent of the fiscal imbalance problem, making it easier to act.  
Moreover, most of the consolidation episodes were of short duration (with some 
exceptions for the IMF-based measure, see Table 1) and involved relatively modest 
gains (Figure 1). However, there were a number of large efforts, amounting to 
improvements of more than 7% of GDP for the four measures of fiscal episodes, as well 
as a few episodes lasting for four years (or more in the case of the IMF-based measure). 
[Figure 1] 
Furthermore, and in general, it is also possible to observe that sizeable consolidation 
episodes also lasted for longer periods, and vice-versa (Figure 2).  
[Figure 2] 
 
3. Success of fiscal adjustments 
It is usually understood that higher real GDP growth is of crucial importance for the 
success of consolidation efforts, notably given also the denominator effect in this 
context. Figure 3.a-d shows the relevance of real GDP growth, relating the change in the 
debt ratio between st and 2+ft  to the change in the output gap between 1−st and 
1+ft (with st  indicating the first year of the fiscal consolidation period and ft the final 
year). The latter change indicates the cumulated difference between actual real GDP 
growth and potential real growth in the years st to 1+ft . Simply eyeballing the charts, 
one can observe that fiscal consolidations tend to bring about reductions in debt ratios 
only if economic growth is strong and the output gap increases. If the output gap falls, 
fiscal consolidations have an associated lower drop in the debt ratio. 
[Figure 3] 
 
For our econometric analysis in this context, we assume that a fiscal adjustment is 
successful (SU) if the improvement in the cyclically adjusted primary budget balances 
                                                          
3 Scatter-plots are available from the authors upon request. 
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(b) for two consecutive years is at least η-times the standard deviation of the cyclically 
adjusted primary budget balance in the full panel: 
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In our analysis we use a threshold value of η = 1 in (2). 
In order to assess the relevance of the composition of the fiscal adjustment we use 
the dummy variable EXP as an explanatory variable in the subsequent Logit analysis. 
Therefore, EXP, as a percentage of GDP, is defined as follows: 
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where exp is the value for total expenditure in year t, and λ is a threshold value 
(assuming the values 1/2, 2/3, 3/4). A similar dummy variable construction, as 
explained in (2), is done regarding total revenue. 
Table 2 reports the number of fiscal consolidation episodes, or events, together with 
the respective success rate for each of the approaches used to determine the fiscal 
episode. According to Table 2, the success rate, measured as the number of successful 
fiscal consolidations over the total number of fiscal consolidation episodes, ranges from 
37% in the IMF so called-policy action-based method to around 64-65% in the FE2 and 
FE3 approaches.  
[Table 2] 
In addition, and from Table 3, we can also observe that the size of the fiscal 
consolidations does not differ much in terms of the share of the consolidation that is 
done via the expenditure side of the budget. This is notably true in the cases of the FE2 
and FE3 approaches, but a slightly relative stronger adjustment is found in this context 
for the two other approaches. 
[Table 3] 
Having determined the nature of the fiscal consolidation episodes as either 
successful or unsuccessful, we can also assess their potential determinants. Therefore, a 
Logit model was estimated, as follows 
 [ ]
i
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Z
Z
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+
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1
|1 , (3) 
where E[S=1|Zi] is the conditional expectation of the success of a fiscal consolidation, 
given Zi, with 
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One can interpret (3) as the conditional probability that a successful consolidation 
occurs given Zi, and in general terms we have: 
 1 2 1 1 2 ( )i i i i i iZ D b EXP b EXPα α β δ δ= + + + + ,  (5) 
where b is the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance, the dummy variable 
EXP was defined in (2), and D is the duration of the fiscal adjustment. The results of 
such estimations are reported in Tables 4 to 7 for each of the four alternative methods 
that we use to determine the fiscal episodes. We also report several thresholds for the 
share of the fiscal adjustment that occurred via spending or revenue. 
 According to our results, in all four cases, the change in the cyclically adjusted 
primary balance contributes positively for the success of a fiscal consolidation. The 
share of the consolidation that takes place via the spending side of the budget has almost 
always a positive estimated coefficient but it is never statistically significant (columns 1 
to 3 in Table 4).4 On the other hand, the estimated coefficients of the share of the 
adjustment that is carried out via the revenue side is almost always negative, and, in the 
case of the FE3 approach for fiscal episodes, is statistically significant (see columns 4 to 
6 in Table 4). Therefore, in these cases, if a fiscal consolidation is more based on the 
revenue side that reduces the corresponding probability of success. 
[Table 4] 
In addition, a larger duration always contributes positively to the probability of 
success of the fiscal adjustment in the approaches FE1, FE2, FE3, but it is not 
statistically significant in the case of the IMF approach. Finally, we also tested the 
possibility of an interaction effect between the change in the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance and the expenditure thresholds but no statistically significant effect was 
uncovered (columns 10 to 12 in Table 4). 
 
4. Conclusion 
We revisited the so-called expansionary fiscal adjustments using alternative 
measures of fiscal episodes. In a panel of OECD countries between 1970 and 2010 we 
assessed to what extent the composition and duration of fiscal adjustments play a role in 
their success via the estimation of logit models. 
                                                          
4 Only the results for the FE3 approach are displayed since the other approaches yielded similar results. 
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We uncover the result that such fiscal episodes tend to bring about reductions in 
debt ratios only if economic growth is strong and the output gap increases. Furthermore, 
the size of the fiscal consolidations does not differ much in terms of the share of the 
consolidation that is done via the expenditure side of the budget. Finally, evidence 
suggests that the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance contributes 
positively for the success of a fiscal consolidation and the opposite applies if the latter is 
more based on the revenue side. Also duration matters and it contributes positively to 
the probability of success of a fiscal consolidation episode. 
 
References 
1. Afonso, A. (2010). “Expansionary fiscal consolidations in Europe: new evidence”, 
Applied Economics Letters, 17 (2), 105-109. 
2. Afonso, A., Nickel, C., Rother, P. (2006). “Fiscal consolidations in the Central and 
Eastern European countries,” Review of World Economics, 142 (2), 402-421. 
3. Alesina, A., Ardagna, S. (1998). “Tales of Fiscal Contractions,” Economic Policy, 
27, 487-545. 
4. Barrios, S., Langedijk, S., Pench, L. (2010). “EU fiscal consolidation after the 
financial crisis:  Lessons from past experience”, European Commission, Economic 
Papers 418. 
5. Devries, P., Guajardo, J., Leigh, D., Pescatori, A. (2011), “An action-based analysis 
of fiscal consolidation in OECD countries”, IMF WP No. 11/128. 
6. Giavazzi, F., Pagano, M. (1996). “Non-keynesian Effects of Fiscal Policy Changes: 
International Evidence and the Swedish Experience,” Swedish Economic Policy 
Review, 3 (1), 67-103. 
7. Giudice, G., Turrini, A., in’t Veld, J. (2004). “Non-keynesian fiscal consolidation in 
the EU? Ex post evidence an ex ante analysis”, CEPR Discussion Paper 4388. 
8. Heylen, F., Everaert, G. (2000). “Success and Failure of Fiscal Consolidation in the 
OECD: A Multivariate Analysis,” Public Choice, 105 (1/2), 103-124. 
9. McDermott, C., Wescott, R. (1996). “An Empirical Analysis of Fiscal 
Adjustments,” International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 43 (4), 725-753. 
10. Perotti, R. (1998). “The Political Economy of Fiscal Consolidations,” Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, 100 (1) 367-394. 
 
 
 
 8
Table 1: Fiscal Episodes (FE), based on the change in the primary cyclically adjusted 
budget balance and on the so-called policy action-based approach 
 
Country IMF FE1 FE2 FE3 
 contractions contractions contractions contractions 
Australia 1980, 1985-88, 1994-99 1987-88 1987-88 1987-88 
Austria  1997 1984, 1997, 2001, 2005 1984, 1997, 2001, 2005 
Belgium 1982-84, 1987, 1990, 1992-99 1982-87 1982-85, 1993, 2006 1982-85 
Canada 1980-1999 1987, 1996-98 1981, 1986-87, 1996-97 1987, 1996-97 
Denmark 1983-86, 1995 1983-87 1983-86 1983-86 
Finland 1984, 1988, 1992-2000, 2006-07 1976-77, 1997-98, 2000-
01 
1976-77, 1981, 1984, 1988, 
1996-97, 2000-01 
1976-77, 1996-97, 
2000-01 
France 1984, 1986-89, 1991, 1995-98, 
2000, 2006-07 
   
Germany 1982-89, 1992-2000, 2003-07    
Greece  1991-92, 1994, 1996-99, 
2006, 2010 
1982, 1986, 1991-92,  1996-98, 
2005-06, 2010 
1991,1994, 1996-97, 
2006, 2010 
Ireland 1982-88, 2009 1976-77, 1983-86, 1988-
89, 2010 
1976-77, 1983-84, 1988, 2010 1976-77, 1983-84, 
1988, 2010 
Italy 1992-98, 2004-07 1977, 1982-83, 1992-94 1977, 1982-83, 1992-93 1977, 1982-83, 1992-93 
Japan 1997, 2003-07 1998-2000, 2005-07 1998-99, 2005-06 1999-00, 2006-07 
Netherlands  1991, 1993 1991, 1993 1991 
Portugal 1983, 2000-03, 2005-07 1977, 1983-84, 1986 1977, 1983-84, 1986, 1988, 
1992, 1995,2006 
1977, 1983-84, 1986, 
1988, 1992 
Spain 1983-89, 1992-98 1987 1986, 1987, 2010 1987 
Sweden 1983-84, 1986, 1992-97, 2007 1984, 1987, 1996-99 1976, 1983-84, 1987, 1996-97 1984, 1987, 1996-97 
United Kingdom 1981-82, 1994-99 1981-82, 1997-2000 1981, 1997-98, 2000 1981, 1997-98 
United States 1980-81, 1985-86, 1988, 1990-
91, 1993-94, 2000 
   
Years with 
episodes 
172 73 79 59 
Average duration 
(years) 
3.8 2.1 1.5 1.6 
Notes: all measures computed by the authors, except the IMF one. 
FE1 – measure based on Giavazzi and Pagano (1996): the cumulative change in the primary cyclically adjusted budget balance is at 
least 5, 4, 3 percentage points of GDP in respectively 4, 3 or 2 years, or 3 percentage points in one year. 
FE2 – measure based on Alesina and Ardagna (1998): the change in the primary cyclically adjusted budget balance is at least 2 
percentage points of GDP in one year or at least 1.5 percentage points on average in the last two years. 
FE3 – measure based on Afonso (2010): a fiscal episode occurs when either the change in the primary cyclically adjusted balance is 
at least one and a half times the standard deviation (from the full panel sample) in one year, or when the change in the primary 
cyclically adjusted balance is at least one standard deviation on average in the last two years. 
IMF – measure computed by Devries et al,.(2010), so-called policy action-based approach to account for consolidation episodes. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Events and successes, 1970-2010 
 
 Total 
Events 
Successes Success 
Rate 
(%) 
IMF 171 63 36.8 
FE1 73 39 53.4 
FE2 79 51 64.6 
FE3 59 38 64.4 
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Table 3: Size of Consolidations, total budget balance, 1970-2010  
 
 Size of consolidation  
(% GDP) 
Average fiscal balance prior to 
consolidation (% GDP) 
Average output growth prior 
to consolidation (%) 
 All Expenditure-
based 
All Expenditure-
based 
All Expenditure-
based 
IMF 0.665 1.199 0.257 0.232 0.998 1.138 
FE1 1.824 2.078 -0.720 -1.007 0.926 0.841 
FE2 2.231 2.251 -1.574 -1.492 0.908 0.857 
FE3 2.314 2.281 -1.340 -1.374 0.886 1.030 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Consolidation successes: logistic regressions (using different thresholds), 
1970-2010 (FE3 case) 
 
Specification Expenditure Revenue Expenditure Interaction 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
constant -2.053** -1.917** -1.669** -0.572 -0.545 -0.669 -6.026*** -6.220*** -5.684*** -1.338** -1.294** -1.251* 
 (0.896) (0.890) (0.835) (0.734) (0.758) (0.725) (1.937) (2.032) (1.854) (0.669) (0.655) (0.654) 
dcapb 1.001*** 0.944*** 0.941*** 0.766*** 0.828*** 0.786*** 1.553*** 1.537*** 1.499*** 0.837*** 0.834*** 0.876*** 
 (0.311) (0.293) (0.298) (0.281) (0.272) (0.285) (0.457) (0.451) (0.443) (0.278) (0.294) (0.278) 
exp23 1.013      1.114      
 (0.691)      (0.800)      
exp12  0.785      1.068     
  (0.677)      (0.802)     
exp34   0.556      0.763    
   (0.675)      (0.797)    
rev23    -1.315*         
    (0.671)         
rev12     -1.108*        
     (0.661)        
rev34      -1.352*       
      (0.693)       
duration       1.770*** 1.836*** 1.752***    
       (0.682) (0.696) (0.662)    
inter23          0.142   
          (0.280)   
inter12           0.077  
           (0.267)  
inter34            -0.042 
            (0.281) 
McFadden 
R2 
0.229 0.217 0.208 0.250 0.237 0.250 0.372 0.370 0.358 0.203 0.200 0.199 
N 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 
Note: the standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. Interaction terms between dcapb 
and EXP. 
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Figure 1: Strength and duration of consolidation episodes: 1970-2010 
1a - FE1 
 
1b - FE1 
2a - FE2 2b - FE2 
3a - FE3 
 
3b – FE3 
4a - IMF 4b - IMF 
Note: budget position measured by the cyclically adjusted primary balance (% of GDP). Source: 
authors’ computations. 
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Figure 2: Relationship between duration and size of consolidation: 1970-2010 
a – IMF b - FE1 
c - FE2 d - FE3 
Note: cyclically adjusted primary balance (% of GDP). Source: authors’ computations. 
 
Figure 3: Output gap (before the episode), debt evolution (after the episode): 1970-2010 
a - IMF 
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b - FE1 
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c - FE2 
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d - FE3 
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Note: change in the debt ratio between ts and tf+2 (%); change in the output gap between ts-1 and 
tf+1(pp). s, f, respectively starting year and final year of the fiscal consolidation. Source: authors’ 
computations. 
